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Abstract. It is often thought that traditional recidivism prediction tools used in criminal 
sentencing, though biased in many ways, can straightforwardly avoid one particularly 
pernicious type of bias: direct racial discrimination. They can avoid this by excluding race 
from the list of variables employed to predict recidivism. A similar approach could be 
taken to the design of newer, machine learning-based (ML) tools for predicting recidivism: 
information about race could be withheld from the ML tool during its training phase, 
ensuring that the resulting predictive model does not use race as an explicit predictor. 
However, if race is correlated with measured recidivism in the training data, the ML tool 
may ‘learn’ a perfect proxy for race. If such a proxy is found, the exclusion of race would 
do nothing to weaken the correlation between risk (mis)classifications and race. Is this a 
problem? We argue that, on some explanations of the wrongness of discrimination, it is. 
On these explanations, the use of an ML tool that perfectly proxies race would (likely) be 
more wrong than the use of a traditional tool that imperfectly proxies race. Indeed, on 
some views, use of a perfect proxy for race is plausibly as wrong as explicit racial profiling. 
We end by drawing out four implications of our arguments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Traditional tools for predicting recidivism—often called actuarial risk assessment 
instruments—employ a fixed number of human-selected variables and a regression-
based algorithm to classify the risk that an individual will re-offend. A commonly 
used example is the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), which employs 12 
variables, including age, history of alcohol abuse, and marital status, to classify 
offenders into one of nine risk categories for violent recidivism.  
Recently, there has been much interest in, and work to develop, more sophisticated 
machine learning-based recidivism prediction tools (Berk and Hyatt 2015). Based on 
a large set of ‘training data’ about a population of offenders, including information 
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about who went on to recidivate,2 a data mining algorithm would derive a model that 
can be deployed to assess recidivism risk in other populations.  
Recidivism prediction tools, whether of the traditional variety (‘traditional tools’) or 
developed through machine learning (‘ML tools’), are commonly criticised for being 
biased against members of certain racial groups. In a well-known example, 
ProPublica criticised the COMPAS algorithm for wrongly predicting recidivism much 
more commonly in Black Americans than White Americans (Angwin et al. 2016; see 
also, Angwin and Larson 2016; Chouldechova 2017; Dieterich et al. 2016). In fact, 
recidivism prediction tools exhibit many different kinds of bias (Barocas and Selbst 
2016; Berk et al. Forthcoming; Chouldechova 2017; Hacker 2018; Zehlike et al. 2020), 
not all of which can be simultaneously avoided (Berk et al. Forthcoming; 
Chouldechova 2017; Corbett-Davies et al. 2017; Kleinberg et al. 2017). However, it is 
often assumed that they can straightforwardly avoid one important kind of bias: 
direct discrimination on the basis of race.3  
Overview of the Chapter 
In this chapter, we explore the justifiability and significance of this assumption, with 
reference specifically to ML tools. We first (§2) describe how traditional tools can be 
designed to avoid direct racial discrimination. We then (§3) identify and describe a 
problem for attempts to extend this strategy to ML tools: though designers of ML 
tools may, strictly speaking, be able to avoid direct racial discrimination, it is not 
clear that they can avoid its wrongness. In the subsequent three sections, we pursue 
this thought by distinguishing various explanations for the wrongness of 
discrimination, in each case asking what the explanation implies for the use of ML 
tools. These explanations advert to procedural unfairness (§4), bad outcomes (§5) and 
disrespect (§6). In §7, we conclude, and draw out some practical implications of our 
argument.  
2. Direct Racial Discrimination and Traditional Tools 
We will use the term ‘direct discrimination’ to refer only to direct racial 
discrimination, and we will take it that A engages in direct racial discrimination 
against B when A treats B less favourably than she treats or would treat comparator 
individual(s) C, (partly) on the basis of B’’s membership of racial group G.4 Direct 
discrimination (sometimes called ‘disparate treatment’) is typically contrasted with 
indirect discrimination (or ‘disparate impact’). At a rough approximation, indirect 
racial discrimination refers to treatment that does not constitute direct racial 
discrimination, but does have a disproportionate negative impact on members of one 
or more racial groups. 
3 
In line with most existing literature, we assume that using a recidivism prediction 
tool would constitute direct discrimination against members of a racial group if (a) 
the tool employs membership of that group as a predictor of recidivism, and (b) 
predicted recidivism is used as a basis for unfavourable treatment. The focus of this 
volume is on criminal sentencing, and when recidivism prediction tools are used in 
sentencing, predictions often are used as a basis for unfavourable treatment: those 
classified into high-risk categories are subjected to longer or otherwise harsher 
sentences. So (b) is often satisfied, and we will henceforth simply assume it to be 
satisfied. However, (a) is not normally satisfied by traditional tools, which typically 
do not employ race as a predictive variable (Starr 2014, 811-2, 824).5 Thus, the use of 
traditional tools is typically not directly discriminatory—at least, not by virtue of 
employing race as a predictor within the tool. 
The use of traditional tools might still constitute direct discrimination for reasons 
extrinsic to the tool.6 For example, a policymaker might decide to employ a particular 
tool in part because she is indifferent to the harms it will impose on a particular racial 
group. Moreover, a traditional tool might be objectionable because it reflects—and 
perhaps amplifies—prior direct discrimination,7 for example, because the data on 
recidivism used to produce the tool was the product of directly discriminatory policing 
or juridical practices (e.g. Lum and Isaac 2016), or because past direct discrimination 
causally contributes to recivdivism in its victims and this is captured by the data (e.g., 
Lippert-Rasmussen 2014, 283-300).8 Finally, use of a traditional tool could be—and 
we suspect often is—indirectly discriminatory, for example, because it has a greater 
negative impact on already disadvantaged racial groups than others, and lacks any 
benefit sufficient to justify this unequal impact.9 However, if membership of G is not 
used as an explicit predictor, it is in principle possible to use traditional tools without 
engaging in direct discrimination. Moreover, this might be thought a significant 
result, for direct discrimination is often regarded as involving forms of wrongdoing 
over and above those present in indirect discrimination.10  
3. Direct Racial Discrimination and ML Tools 
Could designers of ML tools avoid direct discrimination in a similar way? The 
question might initially seem obtuse. After all, it is straightforward to exclude race 
from the list of predictors employed by an ML tool. This can be done by withholding 
information about race from the tool during the training phase.  
However, supposing there is a correlation between race and measured recidivism in 
the training data, an ML tool will, given enough data and in the absence of ‘de-
biasing’,11 likely ‘learn’ a proxy for race—a combination of other factors that to some 
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degree captures the correlation between race and measured recidivism.12 Traditional 
tools often contain such proxies too, but what sets ML tools apart is that, given the 
large amount of data they can be fed, they may learn a perfect proxy for race—a 
combination of variables that fully captures the correlation between race and 
measured recidivism, such that including race over and above this combination would 
have no effect on risk classifications.13 If a perfect proxy were developed, we might 
legitimately wonder whether direct discrimination had been avoided, or avoided in 
any more than name. 
There are two distinct questions here. First, would deploying an ML tool that includes 
a perfect proxy for race literally be directly discriminatory by reason of including that 
proxy? Is treating unfavourably on the basis of a perfect proxy for race just one way 
of treating unfavourably on the basis of race? This will depend in part on how we 
interpret ‘treating unfavourably on the basis of race’. On one reading, A treats B 
unfavourably on the basis of race if and only if the concept of race figures in the causal 
process that leads to unfavourable treatment.14 This need not be the case when A 
treats B unfavourably because B is picked out by a perfect proxy for race. On another 
reading, however, the causal role of the concept of race is irrelevant. What matters is 
the causal role of race itself—whether B is treated unfavourably because B is in fact 
of a certain race.15 If race causes the characteristics that serve as the perfect proxy 
for race, then use of the proxy will, on this reading, constitute direct discrimination.16  
Although philosophically interesting, we set aside this metaphysical issue and focus 
on a second question: even if deploying an ML tool that includes a perfect proxy for 
race would, strictly speaking, avoid direct discrimination, might it nevertheless be 
morally wrong17 for similar reasons and to a similar degree as had it included race 
and thus been directly discriminatory?  
In what follows, we distinguish various explanations commonly given for the 
wrongness of discrimination, broadly construed, and consider what these imply for 
the wrongness of using an ML tool that excludes race as an explicit predictor but 
contains a perfect proxy for race; we call the use of such a tool ‘perfect proxy profiling’. 
Throughout, in assessing the wrongness of perfect proxy profiling we will keep two 
comparators in view: the use of a traditional tool that excludes race as an explicit 
predictor but contains an imperfect proxy for race (‘imperfect proxy profiling’), and 
the use of an ML tool that includes race as an explicit predictor (‘explicit profiling’), 
and which thus directly discriminates. This is because we are motivated by two 
questions. First, does the move from imperfect proxy profiling (via traditional tools) 
to perfect proxy profiling (via ML tools) bring us closer, morally speaking, to direct 
discrimination? And second, does it bring us all the way?  
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With respect to the first question, we will argue that, on some explanations of the 
wrongness of discrimination, perfect proxy profiling is, or is likely to be, more 
seriously wrong than imperfect proxy profiling;18 if ML tools were to learn a perfect 
proxy for race, that would be a problem.19 With respect to the second, we will suggest 
that, on some explanations, perfect proxy profiling could, depending on the 
underlying empirical facts, be as wrong as explicit profiling. This implies that, if we 
exclude race as an explicit predictor only for it to be replaced by a perfect proxy, we 
will have done nothing to mitigate that wrongness.20  
Before turning to these arguments, a preliminary remark concerning our 
terminology. Our ultimate interest in what follows will be in whether, when and why 
the use of recidivism prediction tools would be discriminatory, and therefore wrong. 
However, we will sometimes describe the tools themselves as discriminatory (or 
not).21 We do not mean thereby to suggest that algorithmic tools are agents, that they 
can act wrongly, or that they can be discriminatory in any non-derivative sense.22 
When we say that a tool is discriminatory, we mean only that using it to determine 
sentence harshness would be discriminatory, and in virtue of features of the tool, 
rather than features of the particular, contingent way in which it is used.  
4. Procedural Unfairness 
We begin with the view that discrimination is wrong because it is procedurally unfair. 
Procedural unfairness can be contrasted with substantive unfairness (which we 
consider in §5): procedural unfairness concerns the process via which goods and ills 
are allocated to different people, whereas substantive unfairness concerns the 
resulting pattern of distribution of these goods and ills. If an interviewer discounts a 
candidate’s strengths because of her race, this is procedurally unfair, yet it is 
consistent with things turning out as they should, for example, because the candidate 
is rightly hired anyway. Conversely, a selection procedure, such as preferring 
candidates with better formal qualifications, may seem procedurally fair, yet lead to 
a pattern of distribution that is substantively unfair, for example, because people who 
never had the chance to complete their education are excluded from the most 
attractive jobs.  
One view of procedural fairness is Aristotle’s instruction to “treat like cases alike” 
(Gosepath 2007),23 which is normally taken to imply that fairness requires that any 
two individuals are treated equally unless there is a morally relevant (in the context) 
difference between them (Halldenius 2018).24 Several attempts to explain the 
wrongness of discrimination can be thought of as variants on this view, differing only 
in which differences they take to be morally relevant.   
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For example, explicit profiling has been criticised on the ground that it treats some 
less favourably than others on the basis of facts which they cannot or could not control 
(Boylan 2008; Gardner 1998). We could think of these critiques as asserting the 
Aristotelian criterion of fairness conjoined with the view that differences in 
uncontrollable factors are morally irrelevant. Others suggest that explicit profiling is 
objectionable because it treats some less favourably than others on the basis of 
differences in group membership, not individual characteristics (Miller 1999, 169; 
Shin 2018; Thomas 1992). The underlying thought may be that group-based 
differences are morally irrelevant.  
What do these explanations imply for the wrongness of perfect proxy profiling?  
Assume, first, the control explanation: explicit profiling is wrong when and because 
it treats some less favourably than others based on factors beyond the control of 
both.25 How would perfect proxy profiling compare to explicit profiling on this 
explanation? And how would it compare to imperfect proxy profiling? In most cases 
all three types of profiling will be wrong. Explicit profiling employs at least one 
uncontrollable factor as a predictor: race. Neither perfect proxy profiling nor 
imperfect proxy profiling uses precisely that factor, but both normally employ other 
factors that are beyond an individual’s control, such as age and history of parental 
offending. It would be possible to design a tool that employed only controllable factors 
such as marital status and individual history of offending. However, we are not aware 
of any widely used or advocated tool that takes this approach. In practice, all three 
types of profiling will employ uncontrollable factors, so, on the control explanation, 
all three are procedurally unfair. There is, of course, a further question of how unfair 
they are. Perhaps it could be argued that one type of profiling is more procedurally 
unfair than another if it employs more uncontrollable factors, employs a higher 
proportion of uncontrollable factors, or overall allows uncontrollable factors to more 
strongly influence treatment. However, we see no reason to suppose in advance that 
explicit profiling, perfect proxy profiling and imperfect proxy profiling differ in these 
ways; whether they do will be contingent on precisely which predictors end up in the 
predictive model.  
Consider now the individuality explanation: explicit profiling is wrong when and 
because it fails to treat people as individuals. This explanation can be understood in 
various ways,26 but in our view, the most plausible understanding is offered by 
Thomas (1992). Thomas suggests that a problem with explicit profiling is that it 
employs an unjustifiably coarse predictor (race), ignoring other factors that could and 
should be used to make finer-grained predictions.27 Understood thus, the 
individualist objection seems less powerful against ML tools (whether or not they 
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explicitly employ race) than it is against traditional recidivism prediction tools. ML 
tools can be given a very large set of data, and so can make finer-grained predictions 
than traditional tools. However, the explanation does not clearly distinguish perfect 
proxy profiling or explicit profiling; both are likely to employ (similarly) fine-grained 
predictions. 
In sum, neither the control explanation nor the individuality explanation clearly 
establishes that perfect proxy profiling is more wrong than imperfect proxy profiling, 
or less wrong than explicit profiling.  
5. Negative Outcomes  
A second type of explanation for the wrongness of discrimination adverts to its unfair, 
unjust or otherwise disvaluable outcomes. In this section, we first (§5.1) set out some 
specific versions of this explanation, distinguished by the nature of the outcomes they 
invoke, before (§5.2) considering what they imply for the wrongness of perfect proxy 
profiling vis-à-vis imperfect proxy profiling and explicit profiling. Throughout, we 
will, for ease of exposition, present the explanations as appealing to the badness of 
outcomes, though, as indicated above, these explanations sometimes appeal to some 
more specific disvalue, such as injustice. We will also present the explanations as 
maintaining that individual instances of profiling are wrong when and because they 
produce bad outcomes, although there are also ‘collective’ variants of the 
explanations. Individual acts of profiling that do not cause any bad outcome in 
isolation may form part of a broader pattern of acts that does cause bad outcomes. In 
such cases, it may be right to legislate against all such profiling, thus making 
individual cases wrongful simply because they are rightly legally proscribed (Arneson 
2006; Gardner 1998; 2017). Alternatively, it may be that individual instances of 
profiling can be wrong, even if neither individually harmful nor legally prohibited, by 
virtue of the role that they play in a wider pattern of practices that produces bad 
outcomes. For example, perhaps engaging in profiling makes one complicit in a wrong 
committed collectively by all who profile.28  
5.1 Variants of the Explanation 
One outcome-based explanation for the wrongness of discrimination—the 
proportionality explanation—maintains that it contributes to the under-(over)-
representation of some racial groups in the most (dis)advantaged positions in 
society.29 For instance, explicit profiling may be wrong when and because, partly as 
a result of the profiling, Black people make up a larger share of population of 
offenders classified as ‘high risk’ than of the population at large.30  
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Sometimes, disproportionality does not seem bad in any way. As Binns (2018a, 1) 
notes, there is a statistical disproportion in predicted recidivism between men and 
women, explained partly by the fact that men really are much more likely to 
recidivate (see also Castro 2019, 408).31 It is not obvious that there is anything bad 
about this.  
Nevertheless, disproportionality is often bad, at least instrumentally.32 For example, 
it may contribute to stereotypes that will limit future equality of resources, wellbeing 
or opportunity. Lever (2017) suggests that profiling may lead to harmful essentialist 
ideas of race on which certain races have inherent predispositions to certain kinds of 
crime, while Solanke (2017) takes the central wrong of discrimination to be its 
stigmatizing effect.33 
Disproportionality may also be instrumentally disvaluable because it aggravates 
some past or ongoing group-level injustice (e.g. Yost 2017, 273-82). Suppose that 
racial group G has been subject to systematic oppression in the past, as a result of 
which G-members face stronger incentives to commit crime than others, and thus 
have offended at higher rates. Suppose further that, as a result of their higher 
offending rates, members of this group are overrepresented among those deemed to 
be at high risk of recidivism, and thus among those subjected to the harshest criminal 
sentences. In this case, the harsher than average treatment meted out to G-members 
plausibly aggravates the injustice of the prior oppression by increasing its 
harmfulness.  
We can think of the proportionality explanation as a specific version of a more general 
type of explanation: discrimination is wrong when and because it results in (or is part 
of a wider practice that results in) an unjust, unfair or otherwise undesirable pattern 
of distribution of goods and ills. Some explanations of this type focus, like the 
proportionality explanation, on the distribution of goods and ills across groups. 
Others focus on their distribution across individuals. For instance, one influential 
view (Knight 2018; Lippert-Rasmussen 2014) holds that discrimination is wrong 
when and because it fails to produce the best available pattern of inter-individual 
distribution, as judged by desert-weighted prioritarianism (a theory according to 
which advantages enjoyed by individuals are more morally valuable (i) the worse off 
the individual is, and (ii) the more deserving they are).  
Another type of explanation appeals to bad outcomes that can readily be understood 
in non-distributional terms.34 For example, Hosein (Forthcoming) notes that explicit 
profiling drives a distrust of the state among members of profiled groups. He further 
argues that the extent of this distrust may create a situation where individuals from 
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minority ethnic groups are alienated from their own political society and institutions. 
Such distrust and alienation are bad outcomes regardless of how they are distributed, 
though the fact that they are unequally distributed may make them worse.35  
There are also psychological harms to the individuals who are explicitly profiled. 
These include the psychological effects on the individual who suffers discrimination. 
But they also include effects on others, including victims’ loved ones and members of 
the group who expect future discrimination. Psychological harms identified as 
grounding the wrongness of discrimination include humiliation (Boylan 2008; Bou-
Habib 2011), anger and resentment (Alexander 1992; Kennedy 1997), distress (Brown 
et al. 2000) and fear (Lever 2017; Zack 2015, 59).  
5.2 Implications for Perfect Proxy Profiling 
How does perfect proxy profiling compare to imperfect proxy profiling and explicit 
profiling when judged against the various outcome-based explanations surveyed 
above? The short answer is, ‘it depends’—on which specific explanation we consider, 
the nature of the tool employed, and the context in which it is used. Thus, we will not, 
in this section, seek to derive any straightforward, general answers to these 
questions. Instead, we describe four considerations that will be relevant to answering 
them.  
The first consideration is relevant to the comparison between imperfect proxy 
profiling using traditional tools, on the one hand, and perfect proxy profiling or 
explicit profiling using ML tools, on the other. Whether a move from traditional tools 
to ML tools will exacerbate the bad outcomes discussed in the previous subsection 
depends in part on whether traditional tools under- or over-state the correlation 
between race and measured recidivism. It is tempting to think that, since traditional 
tools contain only an imperfect proxy for race, they must understate any correlation. 
This is incorrect.  
Consider the following hypothetical. There is a positive correlation between 
membership of racial group, G, and measured (not necessarily actual) recidivism. 
However, this is explained by several specific correlations that work in opposing 
directions, with some weakening the overall correlation, and others strengthening it. 
For example, perhaps G-membership is correlated with economic deprivation, which 
makes recidivism more likely, but also with strong familial and community 
relationships, which make recidivism less likely. A traditional tool containing only an 
imperfect proxy for G-membership might over-estimate the positive correlation 
between G-membership and recidivism because, say, the objective, demographic 
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variables used in the tool capture economic factors well, but don’t capture the 
strength of familial or community relationships. By contrast, an ML tool that either 
explicitly employed or contained a perfect proxy for G-membership would capture  
both factors. It would thus yield a weaker correlation between G-membership and 
predicted recidivism. In this context, a move from the traditional tool to an ML tool 
would likely mitigate some of the outcome-based concerns mentioned above. For 
example, G-members would be less over-represented among those predicted to re-
offend by the ML tool than among those predicted to re-offend by the traditional tool.   
In other contexts, however, a move from traditional tools to ML tools could strengthen 
the correlation between race and predicted recidivism. For instance, suppose that 
social deprivation causally contributes to measured recidivism and that a correlation 
between such deprivation and race fully accounts for the correlation between race 
and measured recidivism. Suppose further that a traditional tool employs an official 
measure of deprivation as a predictor, but that this measure understates the degree 
to which deprivation is racialised, say, because it is poor at identifying the types of 
deprivation that are particularly common in minority racial groups. In this context, 
the traditional tool will understate the correlation between race and measured 
recidivism. By contrast, an ML tool that explicitly employs or perfectly proxies race 
will capture the stronger correlation between race and measured recidivism. It will 
thus exacerbate some outcome-based objections. For example, it will deliver even 
more disproportionate results.  
A second consideration relevant to our moral comparison is the claim to advantage of 
those who are harmed by the adoption of one type of profiling in preference to another.  
Suppose, for example, that a move from imperfect to perfect proxy profiling would 
tend to disadvantage G-members; it would slightly increase the proportion of G-
members predicted to recidivate, and slightly decrease the proportion of others 
predicted to recidivate. And suppose that desert-weighted prioritarianism is the 
correct distributive theory: a person’s claim to advantage is stronger the worse off she 
is, and the more deserving she is. Under these assumptions, the move to perfect proxy 
profiling will likely exacerbate distributive concerns if G-members are on average 
worse off and more deserving than others, and mitigate them if G-members are on 
average better off and less deserving than others. 
A third consideration relevant to our moral comparison is the objectivity of the 
outcomes invoked by the particular outcome-based explanation of the wrongness of 
discrimination. Some of the bad outcomes surveyed above are objective in the sense 
that they are wholly independent of anyone’s contingent beliefs about or other 
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attitudes towards the profiling and its consequences. Suppose, for example, that the 
relevant bad outcome is simply that some racial groups are overrepresented among 
those predicted to recidivate. Whether a particular form of profiling produces this bad 
outcome is objective in the sense we have just described. Indeed, the outcome could 
occur even if no-one knew or suspected that any profiling had taken place.  
Others among the bad outcomes cited by the explanations surveyed above are 
subjective—their occurrence is dependent on contingent beliefs about or other 
attitudes towards the profiling. Perhaps the most obvious examples are psychological 
harms. Whether and to what degree a person subjected to profiling is humiliated by 
that profiling will, for instance, depend not only on the racial distribution of risk 
classifications but also on what people believe about this distribution and how it is 
determined. Someone categorised as high risk due to explicit profiling is less likely to 
feel humiliated if they falsely believe the profiling tool neither explicitly employed 
nor tracked race.  
This distinction is particularly relevant to the comparison between perfect proxy 
profiling and explicit profiling. To our knowledge, all of the objections to profiling that 
invoke bad objective outcomes invoke outcomes that are mediated wholly by the way 
in which risk classifications (or misclassifications) are distributed across racial 
groups. Yet perfect proxy profiling and explicit profiling, by definition, produce the 
same (mis)classifications. So they will fare equally when judged against these 
objections.  
The same conclusion cannot, however, be drawn with respect to objections that invoke 
bad subjective outcomes. Though perfect proxy profiling and explicit racial profiling 
produce the same distributions of risk (mis)classifications across racial groups, they 
might nevertheless be perceived differently and thus, for example, give rise to 
different psychological harms.  
The fourth and final consideration is the publicity of the profiling. This is relevant 
only to explanations which invoke subjective outcomes. As noted above, if people do 
not know that profiling takes place, they are presumably less likely to be humiliated 
by it than if the profiling is known. Similarly, if people do not know that profiling 
takes place, this will likely weaken the tendency of profiling to promote widespread 
beliefs about the link between race and crime, so stigmatization will be less likely. 
There are thus some reasons to think that a move from imperfect proxy profiling via 
traditional tools to perfect proxy profiling via ML tools might mitigate some of the 
bad outcomes mentioned above. While any profiling can be done secretly,36 the 
12 
workings of complex ML-derived algorithms are less accessible to the average person 
than traditional tools employing a small number of predictive variables, such as 
VRAG. Thus, it might be that an ML-derived algorithm learned a perfect proxy for 
race, and made sentencing recommendations on this basis, without many people 
knowing about it.  
To the extent that discrimination is wrong by virtue of its subjective outcomes, then 
if an ML tool developed a perfect proxy for race unbeknownst to most people and this 
meant that some bad outcomes were avoided, the profiling would in one respect be 
less wrong than a comparable, publicly open method of profiling. However, it may 
still be more wrong overall, since profiling people in ways that cannot be subjected to 
reasonable public scrutiny contravenes a purported publicity requirement for 
democratic states (Rawls 1996, 68–9).37   
6. Disrespect 
A final influential family of explanations for the wrongness of discrimination centres 
on respect (Beeghly 2018). Some of these explanations appeal to what we call ‘mental 
state disrespect’: discrimination is wrong when and because discriminators act on the 
basis of disrespectful attitudes or fail to act on the basis of respectful attitudes. For 
instance, discriminators might view members of racial minorities with unjustified 
hatred (Garcia 1996); inaccurately judge them to have less than equal moral worth 
(Alexander 1992); be culpably indifferent to their suffering (Alexander 2010, 203); or 
simply fail to take account of them as their moral worth demands (Eidelson 2015).38 
As noted in the introduction, while such possibilities are important, they do not raise 
any particular issue for perfect proxy profiling. Such profiling is plausibly no more or 
less likely to be based on (dis)respectful attitudes than imperfect proxy profiling. It is 
also, we think, not obvious that (imperfect or perfect) proxy profiling would fare any 
better than explicit profiling with respect to mental state disrespect. It seems initially 
plausible that agents motivated by the most disrespectful attitudes would be more 
likely than agents with better attitudes to employ explicit profiling, since they are 
less likely to see it as wrong. But there are reasons to doubt this; given strong legal 
protections against, and social disapproval of, explicit profiling, such agents might in 
fact be attracted to proxy profiling as a way of masking their disrespectful attitudes 
(Barocas & Selbst 2016, 692-3). 
We will not further pursue the thought that the use of recidivism prediction tools 
might be disrespectful on a mental state account. Instead, we focus on an objective 
understanding of disrespect. Accounts which view discrimination as wrong because 
objectively disrespectful have been influential (Glasgow 2009, 2015; Hellman 2008; 
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2018; Scanlon 2008; Shin 2018). While such accounts vary in their detail, they share 
a commitment to the idea that discrimination can be disrespectful, and therefore 
wrong, because of its objective social meaning—for example, because it sends the 
message that members of a particular racial group are inferior—even if there is no 
disrespectful attitude (or lack of a respectful attitude) behind it. Actions can have an 
objective social meaning—where objectivity implies independence from any 
particular individual’s contingent mental states—due to various social and historical 
facts, including facts about how (reasonable) people typically respond when such acts 
are performed.  
Consider, for instance, purchasing a product in a shop. What it means to hand over 
pieces of metal, paper, or plastic is not independent of belief altogether, but its 
meaning does not depend on the particular intentions of specific individuals. If 
Marilyn hands over some legal tender, and a shopkeeper lets her take away some 
chocolate, Marilyn has bought that chocolate regardless of what she believes has 
happened or intended to happen. Similarly, say proponents of the objective meaning 
explanation, a discriminatory act can have a disrespectful meaning even if the 
discriminator has exemplary attitudes, and even if the victim neither knows nor 
suspects the act to be discriminatory (Glasgow 2015, 121). For example, it may have 
the meaning because many victims reasonably believe that acts of this type are 
normally motivated by objectionable attitudes.  
Suppose the social meaning account of disrespect is correct.39 This raises the issue of 
what the social meaning would be of using an ML tool where (a) the tool contains a 
perfect proxy for the offender’s racial group, and (b) the tool classifies the offender as 
high risk partly on the basis of this proxy.  
One option is to see ML tools as both novel and unique, and hence currently lacking 
any social meaning. On this view, while the use of ML tools might over time develop 
a social meaning, it currently lacks one. This would mean, a fortiori, that perfect 
proxy profiling cannot be objectively disrespectful.  
However, racial profiling and offender risk-assessments based on traditional tools are 
now familiar practices, and it is plausible to think that the social meaning of these 
practices would immediately extend to the use of ML tools. The interesting question 
is whether the meaning of perfect proxy profiling (via use of an ML tool that excludes 
race as an explicit predictor) would be closer to that of explicit profiling (via use of an 
ML tool that includes race as an explicit predictor), or to that of imperfect proxy 
profiling (via use of a traditional tool). We suspect that it would be closer to the 
former. This can be supported by considering the following imaginary example.  
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Suppose that there are only two towns—Springfield and Shelbyville—in a sparsely 
populated region of the USA. The residents of Springfield regard all residents of the 
closest town, Shelbyville, with hatred, simply because they are from Shelbyville. 
However, no Springfielder has ever been to Shelbyville, while Shelbyville residents—
knowing about their neighbours’ attitudes—avoid Springfield. All residents of both 
towns are thus unaware that all residents of Springfield are White, while all 
Shelbyville residents are Black. One day Bart, a Springfielder, decides to go to 
Shelbyville to steal their town monument. On arrival, he realises the facts about the 
racial divide. He also learns the reasons for the divide: several generations earlier, a 
combination of explicit racism on the part of White residents, and racialised economic 
disadvantage suffered by Black residents, caused Black Springfielders to leave and 
establish Shelbyville. While these facts were not actively hidden in subsequent 
generations, they were not widely discussed, and so most residents of both towns are 
unaware of their joint history. When Bart gets back to Springfield, he tells all his 
friends these facts, and soon most Springfielders know them. Yet their negative 
attitudes persist.    
Both before and after Bart's visit, Springfielders engage in some actions—such as 
avoiding Shelbyville and expressing hatred for Shelbyvillians—that are motivated in 
part by their hatred of Shelbyvillians. What should we say about the social meaning 
of these actions? Before Bart's visit, Springfielders hate Shelbyvillians, but no 
resident of either town has reason to think that 'Shelbyvillian' is co-extensive with 
'all and only the Black residents of my local region', nor that it picks out a group 
whose forebears were victimised by Springfielders. While actions motivated by this 
hatred might have a morally questionable social meaning, it is very doubtful that 
they express racial disrespect. But once Bart and most other Springfielders realise 
the racial extension of their attitudes, and the underlying historical facts, things 
plausibly change. Saying "I want nothing to do with anyone from Shelbyville" very 
plausibly takes on a racially disrespectful meaning now that it is widely known that 
this covers all and only the Black residents of one's local region, and that Black people 
have historically been disadvantaged, in part due to explicit racism on the part of 
one’s own predecessors. Moreover, it is plausible that it takes on this meaning even 
in cases where the particular person making the utterance is one of the few 
Springfielders who still does not know the relevant racial and historical facts, and 
even where this ignorance is blameless. 
Similarly, our view is that, at least once it becomes clear and widely known that an 
ML tool has learned a perfect proxy for membership of  a racial group known to have 
been subject to systematic and racially motivated oppression, use of the tool would 
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plausibly come to express distinctively racial disrespect. At least, we think this would 
plausibly be so if use of the tool is accompanied by no efforts to mitigate its racialised 
meaning or disparate racial impacts, and if members of the oppressed racial group 
reasonably regard use of the tool as manifesting an indifference to the past injustice 
on the part of those who designed or use the tool (whether or not it in fact manifests 
such an indifference).40 Indeed, it seems plausible that use of the tool in this context 
would be just as disrespectful as would using a tool that explicitly uses membership 
of the racial group in question, holding fixed the attitudes of those who designed and 
use the tool.  
By contrast, the presence of a racially disrespectful social meaning becomes far less 
clear when the proxy is imperfect and understates the correlation between race and 
measured recidivism. Consider a variant of the Springfield-Shelbyville case in which 
some migration of Black people from Springfield to Shelbyville still occurred, and for 
the same reasons, but many Black people remained in Springfield, and many White 
people also migrated to Shelbyville for reasons unconnected to race. As a result, 
Springfield is only 55% White, and Shelbyville 55% Black. In this version of the case, 
it is less clear that the Springfielders’ hatred-motivated actions have a racist meaning 
once the facts are widely known. Similarly, it is not clear to us that continuing to use 
a traditional recidivism prediction tool after discovering that one of the predictors it 
employs is weakly correlated with race has the same social meaning as continuing to 
use a tool discovered to contain a perfect proxy for race.  
To be clear, we are not suggesting here that use of an imperfect proxy would never 
express racial disrespect or even that it would always express less disrespect than 
use of a perfect proxy.41 Rather, our claim is that, at least in some cases—most likely 
when the proxy is weak—it would express no or less disrespect. This, then, may be 
one respect in which perfect proxy profiling is more seriously wrong than at least 
some instances of imperfect proxy profiling.  
7. Conclusion and Implications for Sentencing 
We have considered three different types of explanation for the wrongness of 
discrimination, adverting respectively to procedural unfairness, bad outcomes, and 
disrespect. What do these explanations imply for the wrongness of ML-based perfect 
proxy profiling in criminal sentencing, vis-à-vis ML-based explicit profiling, and 
imperfect proxy profiling using traditional tools?  
One version of the appeal to procedural unfairness holds that discrimination is wrong 
when and because it treats some less favourably than others on the basis of factors 
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beyond their control. This explanation does not clearly distinguish perfect proxy 
profiling from imperfect proxy profiling or explicit profiling; they all employ 
uncontrollable factors as predictors and there is, we think, no reason to suppose in 
advance of looking in detail at a particular tool that one type of tool will rely more 
heavily on such factors than another. Another version holds that discrimination is 
wrong when and because it fails to treat people as individuals. This explanation again 
fails to clearly distinguish perfect proxy profiling from explicit profiling. However, it 
may suggest that both, being ML-based, are typically less wrong than imperfect proxy 
profiling using traditional tools, since ML tools would normally employ finer-grained 
predictors.  
Consider next explanations that appeal to bad outcomes. It is difficult to draw any 
straightforward and generalisable conclusions regarding the implications of these 
explanations for the three types of profiling under consideration. However, one 
relatively clear implication is that perfect proxy profiling will fare no better or worse 
than explicit profiling with respect to explanations that invoke bad objective 
outcomes. Another is that, to the extent that imperfect proxy profiling understates 
the correlation between race and measured recidivism, a move to ML tools that either 
include race or a perfect proxy for it will tend to strengthen racial disproportionality, 
increasing the degree to which members of the group picked out by the proxy are 
overrepresented amongst those assigned the highest risk classifications, and thus 
amongst those given the harshest sentences. It will thus tend to exacerbate the 
(further) bad outcomes, such as stigmatization, to which such disproportionality often 
contributes.  
Consider, finally, disrespect-based explanations. None of the three types of profiling 
under consideration need involve mental state disrespect, and it is an open empirical 
question which is or are more likely to do so; however, all could involve social meaning 
disrespect. We suggested that, in certain contexts, perfect proxy profiling would 
plausibly be more disrespectful, with regard to its social meaning, than imperfect 
proxy profiling, and indeed that it may be as disrespectful as explicit profiling.  
What implications might our arguments have? Let us briefly mention four. 
First, our arguments cast doubt on the thought that, as we move from traditional to 
ML tools, we should retain the practice of excluding race from our predictive models. 
On none of the explanations that we have surveyed is it obvious (though on some it 
is arguable) that perfect proxy profiling using ML tools is, or is typically, less 
seriously wrong than explicit profiling using such tools. This suggests that, if an ML 
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tool would indeed learn a perfect proxy for race, preventing it from explicitly 
employing race may not mitigate its wrongness.  
Second, some of the views that we have considered are reassuring about the move 
from traditional to ML tools, whether or not those latter tools explicitly employ race. 
If the appeals to procedural fairness and/or mental state disrespect exhaust the 
wrongness of discrimination, there may be no reason to fear the move from traditional 
to ML tools, since, on these views, neither perfect proxy profiling nor explicit profiling 
via ML tools is clearly more seriously wrong than imperfect proxy profiling.  
Third, on other views, however, the move to ML tools is of concern. Suppose that 
explanations appealing to bad outcomes or objective social meanings account for some 
of the wrongness of discrimination. On these views, imperfect proxy profiling is 
already morally problematic, but a move to either explicit or perfect proxy profiling 
exacerbates some of these problems. This suggests that the move to ML tools may 
bring with it a greater need for de-biasing measures.  
Finally, a fourth possible implication of our arguments is that they may cast doubt 
on one objection to such de-biasing. De-biasing methods typically require that the 
recidivism prediction tool explicitly take race into account, for example, in order to 
adjust classifications or segment analysis on the basis of race (e.g., Corbett-Davies 
and Goel 2018, esp. 2, 14). One possibility, for example, is to set a different risk 
threshold for deeming a person to be high-risk depending on their racial group.42 Yet 
factoring race into tools is sometimes thought problematic, perhaps because it is 
taken to involve direct discrimination.43 Hellman (2020) challenges this view at the 
level of law, arguing that explicitly employing race in an algorithm will not always 
be unlawful in the US.44 Our analysis suggests another kind of response. Even if de-
biased algorithms would be directly discriminatory, that might not give us a decisive 
moral reason to eschew them, since ‘raw’ (i.e. not de-biased) algorithms may be 
morally wrong in similar ways and to a similar degree. This will be plausible if direct 
discrimination is wrong by virtue of its disrespectful social meaning, bad objective 
consequences, procedural unfairness, or some combination of these. We argued that 
none of these factors clearly distinguish perfect proxy profiling from explicit profiling.  
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